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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. B. ROGERS HEL~IAN, forn1erly 
kno,vn and being one and the san1e 
person as N. B. ROGERS, 
Plain-tiff' and Respondent, 
vs. 
\V. C. PATERSON, ASA LLOYD 
HEFLIN, MEL ':--IN C. BOWLES, 
FIRST DOE, SECO·ND DOE, 
THIRD DOE, and FOURTH DOE, 
Defendants 01nd, App,ella.nts. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7552 
DONALD T. ADAMS, 
F ~ Y K D Monticello, Utah, . l L ·~) R . :s. JOHNSON, 
JMI~ 2 J ,,.~J I 207 Atlas Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah, 
:. =. : :...; ..:;; - -·- -- - ---- ----------· ---------.. 
Lhn'k, SYpc~me Court, Utah Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respo-ndent. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. B. ROGERS HELMAN, formerly 
known and being one and the same 
person as N. B. ROGERS, 
Plaintiff ·and Respon·dent, 
vs. 
W. C. PATERSON, ASA LLOYD 
HEFLIN, MEL 'TIN C. BOWL.ES, 
FIRS·T DOE, SECO·ND DOE, 
THIRD D·OE, and FOURTH DOE, 
Defendants and~~ Appellants. 
STATEMENT O·F F ACT·S 
Case No. 
7552 
The statement of facts in the brief of defendant and 
appallent omits facts having a material bearing on the 
cause, and particularly in connection with what con-
stitutes the gravamen of the action. The att~ention of 
the Court is invited to the fact that after the defendant 
and appellant, W. C. P·aterson, and plaintiff arid respon-
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dent, N. B. Rogers (Helman), had undertaken to P'ro-
cure mining claims in ·Colorado (Tr. 5, 22), they pro-
~ured two groups of mining claims in Utah (Tr. 6). 
These two latter mentioned groups are referred to in 
the testimony as ~h.e ''Eleven claims'' and the ''Yellow 
Circle Claims.'' Such mining claims were to be acquired 
jointly (i.e. one-half in the name of each of the respon-
dent and app~ellant ( Tr. 5, 7, 9, 33, Ex. 1, 25), and half 
of the interest in· the claims was to be reserved for 
persons assisting in the financing of the venture, and the 
other half was to be held by appellant and respondent 
after certain expens·es (Tr. 22, 25, 78) were adjusted, 
after which and ultimately a corporation to he formed 
was to take o~er the ground ( Tr. 5, 24, 30, Ex. 3, 4, 6, 
10, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23), and those supplying the 
financing were to take half the stock (Tr. 78). The 
company to he formed was to he known as the Ar.cana 
Development ·Company, and, after certain eXlpenses, re-
spondent and app-ellant were to divide the other half of 
the corporation's stock (Tr. 78). The title to the Yellow 
Circle group of mining claims, purchased by contract 
dated June 1, 1948 (Ex. C) was taken in the joint names 
of respondent and appellant, in accordance with their 
understanding as to holding titles ('Tr. 73, 74, Ex. 29). 
Later, the appellant Paterson p.rocured from the respon-
dent Rogers a blank signed deed or deeds, ostensibly 
for the purpose of .enabling the ap:pellant Paterson to 
furnish a deed if a contemplated sale .concerning the 
group of "Eleven" claims was made (Tr. 16, 17, 45, 
Ex. 20, 21). No sale ·of the so-called ' 'Eleven'' claims 
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being consununated, appellant filled in the deed signed 
by respondent Rogers with his own name as grantee, 
added the description of the ''Yellow Circle" claims, 
and had the deed recorded ( Tr. 42, 43, 45, Ex. 29). No 
consent or permission '""as procured from the respon-
dent Rogers to so use the deed, which effected the trans-
fer of her half interest in the legal title to the "Yellow 
Circle Claims'' to appellant p·aterson (Tr. 17, 18, 67, 
76). Learning of the recording of this deed, respondent 
instituted this action to protect her interest by having 
the deed set ·aside or annulled, and having her legal title 
to a half interest in the ''Yellow Circle'' group quieted 
against appellant PaterS'on, in order to preserve the 
pre-existing arrangement (Tr. 12, 18, 20, Rec. 37-58). 
Judgment was rendered in respondent's favor, quieting 
title to a half-interest in the claims in h·er favor ( Tr. 
81-83, Rec. 14-19). From this judgment and decree and 
the court's denial of a motion to modify the findings, 
conclusions, and decree (Rec. 20, 21, 10, 8) def.endant 
Paterson appeals on the grounds set forth commencing 
at page 6 of app-ellant's brief. 
There is testimony that respondent Rogers raised 
$40,000.00 approximately to assist in the acquisition of 
these various claims (Tr. 19, 26), and appellant contends 
(Tr. 40, 57) that the major portion of the money raised 
was used on the other p·rop·erties, leaving him to pay the 
larger !portion of the amounts due on the ''Yellow Circle'' 
group's purchase price. On page 6 of appellant's brief, 
counsel sets out figures for the purpose of showing that 
payments on the "Yello\v Circle" group amounted to, 
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and were apportionable as there mentioned, and asserts 
that such testimony was uncontradicted. The latter 
assump,tion is erroneous. The given figur·es were neither 
contradicte·d or gone into (1) Because the ·Court indi-
cated he wa:s not allowing an a,ccounting in the instant 
action (Tr. 42), (2) Ap·pellant's own counsel asserted in 
the proceedings that the matter was only a "simple" 
suit to quiet title (Tr. 12), (3) Because as shown very 
clearly by the record Exhibit "B~", from which some of 
the figures quoted in a'ppellan t 's brief are taken, was 
NEVER AD·MITTED (Tr. 27), and the use of Exhibit 
qG'', another statement, was LIMITED as shown in the 
discussion concerning its ·admissibility, to the purpose 
of p·roving an understanding was had by these parties 
iat a meeting in Kansas City, and NO·T F:OR. AL·L 
PURP,OSES, or for the figures therein, as counsel for 
appellant so blandly assume, and would have the Court 
believe (Tr. 65, 66). Exhibit "H", another statem~ent, 
insofar as the record covers the matter, does not appear 
to have been anywhere off.ered or received ( Tr. 6.6 et seq) 
as such. Respondent asks the Court to bear in mind that 
the figures set out are only as appellant contends them 
to lbe, and, that the p·roffered exhibits from which they 
were purportedly quoted, are either not in evidence, or 
the ·admission of same was for a limited purpose, not 
concerned with the itemization of the figures ap!pearing. 
It is also a matter set out in the evidence that any 
accounting or settlement was to be had as between these 
l,itig~nts in connection with their dealings when the 
prop·erties were turned over to the corporation, which 
time, at the trial of this cause below, had apparently 
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not yet arrived (Tr. 20, 25, 28). This general statement 
is made to correct impressions that may have arisen from 
appellant's statement of facts, and, further facts will be 
mentioned in presentation of the arguments herein. 
ARG U~'[ EN T 
R.ESPONDENT'S POINT I.-NO INCOMPL·ETE 
DECREE WAS ENTERED. 
(a) A WRONGDOER NOT ENTITLED TO· AID 
OF EQIDTY COURT. 
It is a cardinal doctrine of equity jurisprudence that 
parties do not come into the equity court as of right, 
but, only if the court in consideration of all the circum-
stances will p·ermit. The court may have power to h·ear 
nr determine certain actions, yet decline to do so where 
the circumstances justify, as shown in: 
Equ.ity - Section 9, Distinction Betw-een 
Power and Jurisdict~ovn: 
"There is a clear distinction between the 
term 'jurisdiction' in its strict meaning ·and as 
generally used in equity jurisprudence. Tech-
nically, jurisdiction is the power to hear and 
deterrnine the subject matter in controversy be-
tween the parties to a suit, and jurisdiction as 
thus defined does not mean simply jurisdiction 
of a particular case, hut jurisdiction of the class 
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of._ cases to which the particular ca.se b-elongs, or 
as sometimes stated, power residing in the 
1
Court 
to hear -·and determine an action. It is common, 
howe.ver,:_t;o spook of jwrisdic;t.ion.in equity o-r the. 
jurisdiction of .Ia Gourt of equtity a$ not relating 
to t.he pow·er of the oourt to hear ood dletermine 
~a oaru;se, but as relatilng to whether it ought to 
assume the jurisdiction, ~wnd hear ~and decide the 
caus-e, ~ovr as:~·re..latiwg._ .t-o. t.he_ cases or ocCJas~ons 
wh.ern the p~ow·er ·to he1ar and determine will be 
exercised. THJ.S DlSTJN(}TION IS IMPORT-
ANT .AND SHOULD NOT BE LOST SIGHT 
.. , . 9.F .. ~'-.·. 30,Q.J .. S., :eages ~2~~328._ 
--. 
Ap~pellant cites numerous cases wherein relief was 
- . I • - .. , , " 
enlarged, or where on appeal the appellate courts held 
the measure of relief (even to an adversary p·arty:) was 
incomplete or insufficient (P'ages 8-9, Appellant's Brief). 
Perusal of such cas~es indicates that for the most 'part 
~ • • ,. ·, f •• 
they are based· on the doctrine that he who comes into 
equity m~st do equity, and the appellate courts found 
that .. the trial courts had not required the party s~eeking 
relief in all respects to do equity~ For example, in 
Stromerson vs. Averill, 121 P. 2d 826; 126 P. 2d 392; 
141 P. 2d 732, 133 P. 2d 617, it was held in various 
appeals that, as in,ci,de~tal to. hoJding a~ ~gent taking 
lands of his princip~al in his .-own name (Le. the agent's) 
held,~ them~ for ,t}l~ p·rincip~~l, t4at contracts, crop con-
tr.-acts, c.hat~el mortgages, and other obligations in the 
:ag~n~'s· -~a~e alone, and on which he was therefor per-
sonally bound to third _p-arties, must b~, when the prin-
!cip~J took over, assumed by the princip,al, and suitable 
provision- or indemnity made for procuring the -agent's 
·release· ·from future liability thereon. Biacon vs. Wahr-
haftig, 218 P. 2d 144, holds that in a statutory partition 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
action, that all parti·es named 1n the statute must be 
joined to 1nake a d~ree, and that it was the duty of the 
court to so order. LaJ olla Oasa Demanarn.a vs. Hopkins, 
219 P. 2d 871, holds that where a seller had reserved 
the right of use of a house on the property sold, for the 
duration of the war and had wrongfully held over (as 
deter1nined in the action), that as incidental to the :ter-
mination of the rights of user, the court would retain 
jurisdiction to assess damages. Floor vs. Johnson, 199 
P. 2d 347, provides another example of granting inci-
dental telief by holding after the cancellation of shares 
of stock in a corporation, that directors elected on basis 
of votes excluding the can,celled shares would be· seated. 
Ludlow vs. Ca~o·rado Animal By-Products Co., 137 P. 
2d 347, and Kivnsmaw vs. Utah Gas & Coke Q1o., 177 p·. 
419, hold that incidental relief in the way of damages 
will be assessed in a cause brought to restrain a nuisance, 
hut where injunctive relief would not be granted due to 
delays-in bringing the suit. 
But, appellant .ove;rlooks t.he fact tha.t in all t.hese 
cases that the party se.eking ·affirmative relief was wot 
·a WRONGD·OER himself, or, that it W'as equit·able t:o 
require a party w·ho w'as seeking relief to p•er~o1rm som.e 
condition rprreced.ent as .a con.dit~on of relief, not to aid 
the w·rongdoer, but t;o prevent wnd!ue ad(l}arntage or en-
richment of the party seeking relief. IN NO INSTAN'CE 
WAS RELIEF PREDICATED ON THE. WRONG-
DOER'S RIGHT TO HAVE THE INTER.PO,SITION 
OF THE EQUITY COURT. See: 
Sect~on 401, Ma.xim as to :CleOJn) Ha;nd.s,-
F.raud. 
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''Another familiar illustration of the prin-
ciple may he found in all cases wh·ere the plain-
tiff's claim is affected by his own fraud * * * 
The maxim is mor·e frequently invoked in cases 
upon fraudulent contract. 
* * * * 
'' On.e who w·rongfully ·approp~r~a.tes p1101perty 
of an.ot:he:r for his iOWn use will not receive the 
,aid of .a covurt of equity in ·aWJJ matte.r with which 
such rep,rehensible oondruct is conne!cted1. A. court 
of equity will not 1aid 1one who, standing in a 
reZat·ion '0 f confidenc·e 'tiOI arno ther commits acts 
in vio~ation of his .trust w~hich .are imm.edia.tely 
connected with the subject mntter of the litiga,.. 
tion." 2 Pomeroy's Equity ,Jurisprudence (5th 
Edition, Symons) Page 104. 
IT IS APPROP'RI.ATE TO· REMIND T'HE 
C·OURT, at this point, that the appellant Paterson, who 
seeks to invoke the aid of an equity court for an ~ccount­
ing, and other relief, is the WRONGDOER. He misused 
the deed, he put the title in his own name, he filled in 
the blanks in the deed to cover 1property which the instru-
m~ent was not intended to cover. Appellant's elaims for 
relief do not, therefore, commend themselves to a court 
of equity, and it was eminently proper for the trial court 
to limit the· issues to the qui~eting of the title to the half 
interest (defendant and appellant's title to the other 
half of the ground has not been di~turhed or affected 
by these proceedings), and, no incomplete relief exists. 
While actual fraud on appellant's part was not found 
by the court, still a misuse of the deed was the basis of 
annulling it and quieting title to the half interest of 
respondent. Even fraud is not the sole ground for deny-
ing equitable relief, other misconduct may bar a re1nedy. 
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In Co'U11nonwealth Finance C1ompany vs. McH~ar!J, 
1922, 282 Fed. 560, the circuit court of appeals enunci-
ates the whole rule, while applying it in a fraud case, 
as follo,vs : 
Page 569: ~'To call into action the 'processes 
of a court of equity, the right asserted, must 
appeal to the conscience 1of the chancellor. In 
DeWeese vs. Reinhard, (165 U.S. 386, 390, 17 
Sup. Ct. 340, 341, -±1 La\v Ed. 757), it was stated, 
·A. court l()f equity acts only W'hen and as conscience 
com1'Ylands, and if the condu~ct of the plaintiff 
be off ewsive to the dictates of natural justice, * * * 
he will be held remediless in a court 101f equity.' 
A. nd, in such case, w-e think the defenda;n)t who 
asks affirmativ·e relief, is in no better position 
thwn is a plaintiff.'' 
Coercion as a ground of wrongdoing has been h·eld 
to preclude relief, in the case of Phez VB. Salem Fruit 
Co., 1925, 233 Pac. 547, 133 Ore. 398, where the court 
says: 
Page 556 : '' ( 5) This (situation) is shown 
by testimony upon the trial between plaintiff and 
the growers. A court of equity should leave the 
growers and the Northwest Company and its 
assignee in the same place they were when the 
company attempted by using and coercing the 
union to overreach the growers and obtain an 
unfair contract by the means indicated.'' 
Again, in relation to accountings, in 1 American 
Jurisprudence, Page 303, Section 56, Accounts, and 
Accounting, we find the rule: 
'' * * * ·One may, by his misconduct be pr~e­
cluded fron1 the right to an accounting in equity 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
by virtue of the requirement that the complainant 
must come into ·Court with clean hands * * *." 
Indeed, in Hultz vs. Taylor, 181 Pac. 2d, 515, one 
of the very cases relied upon by ruppellant, who was in 
this instance a wrongdoer, we find this statement: 
Page 520: " ( 3, 4) But in any caS'e wherein 
the court has equity jurisdiction, the relief prayed 
fo.r by the p1arties is not ~a controlling factor. The 
prayer of 1a petition or a cross-petition is not a 
part of the stat.ement of the cause of actvow. The 
purpose which the prayer serves is to indicate 
the relief to which the pleader may think he is 
entitled. See Eberhart Lumber Company vs. 
Lecuyer, 153 Kan. 386, 389, 110 Pac. 757. Para-
graph 2 of the syllabus of the last cited case reads 
as follows: "A trial cou.rt sitting as ·a court of 
equity is not obli.ged vo render the specific decree 
prayed: for, but m.a.y render a ·decree in a~ccordarnce 
with its own judgment or discretion a.s to what 
just~ce dema;nd.s in view of t.he "acts 1Jleaded and 
the evidence ~adduced.' '' 
In Richman vs. Ba;nk of Perris, 1929, 282 Pae. 2d 
801 (California), the court cites with approval at page 
807, the cas·e of Allste1ad vs. L(l!Umeister, 16 Cal. App. 
59, 116 P'ac. 296, 297, which latter case quotes with ap-
proval the rule from Pomeroy, already above eited 
herein as 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th Edi-
tion, Symons) Page 104. 
The general equitable rule has been reeognized in 
Utah: See Jones Min.ing Co. vs. C·ardiff Mining & Mill-
ing Co., 191 Pac. 426, 56· Utah 449 (1920), where the 
court says at page 434: 
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H * • * and "'"hile I unhesitatingly assert that 
a court of equity should not permit a wrongdoer 
to profit by his "'"rong, * * * '' 
The court in its sound discretion was not bound 
to permit an aceounting, or to ·enlarge the issues of the 
case, and, having the rig·ht, as. ·a matter of oonscien·ce, 
to decline to aid appellant Paterson, no compJaint for 
incompleteness of the decree can be made, if appellant 
\\'"a.sn 't entitled to any decree at all. It is p·erfectly clear 
from the evidence that these two 'parties each had legal 
title to an lmdivided half interest in the "Yellow Circle" 
group. '\VhateYer other equities or rights existed between 
them, the ·Court by annulling the deed which the app·el-
lant Paterson filled out wrongfully and r·ecorded, and 
which deed transferred respondent Roger's (Helman's) 
interest to him in violation of the relationship· existing, 
has merely put them in the same relative position as they 
were before the wrongful use of the deed. Appellant, 
\vho wrongfully caused the changed status, cannot com-
plain if- the court reinstates the original status, he has 
no grounds for cognizance in the forum of equity. 
(b) DELINEATION OF INTEREST UNNEC-
ESS.A.RY TO A C011:PL·ETE DECREE. 
It n1ay well be that in the absence of predetermined 
agreement, that a court would adjudge joint purchasers 
of a com1non tract to hold title in proportion to their 
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respective interests, but, where 'the: interests, were by 
the ~agreements, understandings, and conduct of the 
parties such, that each was to hold legal title to a half 
interest, the trial Court, or any other Court, would have 
no grounds for substituting a diff·erent basis of owner-
ship than that agreed on, anything else would constitute 
a rewriting of the existing contract and understanding 
for the tparties otherwise than in accordance with their 
right of contract. No contention is made, nr has ever 
been made by the respondent, insofar as the :vecord 
shows, that her proper portion of the cost of the Yell ow 
Circle claims should not in due time, and in accordance 
with the understandings of the parties, he paid, IF SHE 
ACTUALLY O·WES ANY BALANCE. Assuming, with-
out conceding that the law respecting co-owners is cor-
rect as set out in appellant's brief, the court is still con-
fronted with the fact that whatever may be the pr·esent 
p·roportion of r·espondent's contributinn to the purchase 
price of the ''Yell ow ·Circle'' it would not be proper 
to ~pportion the '' Y·ellow Circle'' Jlaims on the basis 
of contributions made to those claims alone, when; the 
state of •accounts between the parties over the whole 
period of dealings might mak·e the appellant's proportion 
smaller, or even non-existent. As me!ltioned in the state-
ment of facts, the full facts and figures concerning the 
overall amounts of payments on all the properties of 
these participants, is not before this Court, nor was it 
before the trial court, and to try to piecemeal the account-
ing by affording the ap·p·ellant a lien against the ''Yellow 
Circle'' group, when 'by reason of the situatinn existing 
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in the larger scope of the parties' o:perations the lien 
n1ight be s1naller, or non-existent, due· to other offsets 
would be unfair. Furtherrno~e, whether the caus-e and 
court below· """ould be a proper forum to determine all the 
inter-related questions bet,veen the parties is most ques-
tionable, since there is realty in Colorado involved, 
questions relating to the rights of in¥estors involved, 
rights of the Arcana Development C'Ompany, who might 
all be proper parties, and, the need might exist for evi-
dence and \Vi tnesses from ·Colorado, Kans-as, or else-
where. Note also, that appellant did not seek to inter-
plead any other defendants, nor did he confess his 
wrongdoing, and seek to have a general accounting, or 
anything like that~uite the contrary, in the p·rayer to 
appellants' answer and cross-complaint, the relief s!pe-
cifically sought was to have respondent's title decZared 
invalid, and the title to the i,nterest ·in quest'iJorn quiete:d 
in appellant. Certainly, that w-asn't coming in on the 
theory of doing equity, quit.e the cont.ra.ry! Lastly, it 
does not appear from the testimony in the record that 
any accounting is required in court-for the parties indi-
cated they had the neeessary records to make adjust-
men~s between themselves, ·and there 'vas nothing to indi-
cate that the accounting could not and would not be 
Inade, when the time set for the same arrived, at the 
ti1ne of turning over the p.roperties to the corporation 
and adjusting the state of accounts. An inspection of 
the proffered exhibits, for the purported partial account 
on the '' Y.ellovv Circle'' claims, sho\VS that some items 
are esti1nates, others are totals, and not itemized, \vhich 
makes it im·practical to deal in ultimate totals without 
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better support. Since ·Courts of Equity do not require 
parties to do us·eless things, or to spend money in court 
adducing items 'Of account which could be, to all intents 
and purposes, determined between them otherwise, the 
Court below, was manifestly right in leaving them to 
work the matter out, without trying to impose liens, or 
delineate interests, or the like. 
The question of res judicata us hereinafter argued 
in point II of this brief will be discussed at length there-
in, and is mentioned at this point to show that it has not 
been omitted from consideration. Since as argu·ed in 
subdivision (a) of this point I, the decree was not in-
complete for failure to provide for complete relief when 
app,ellant was not entitled to any relief, and as in sub-
division (b) that no delineation of interest or impress-
ment of a lien was pro!per, it was not error for the court 
to, in view of all the circumstances, to refuse to modify, 
amend, or recast the findings, conclusions, and judgment, 
particularly since on the basis even of the proposed 
evidence of iappellant, no prop·er halan:ces could be struck 
at this time. 
RESPONDEN:T'S P,OINT II: INS,TANT DE-
CREE NO·T RES JUDICATA TO· AC·C.OUNTING. 
Since the record of the trial and the transcript pre-
pared for this appeal clearly shows the· fact that an 
accounting between the parties was not allowed or had 
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in this action, it would not, as ~appellant contends, oper-
ate to bar him on that point iri a subsequent proceeding, 
if such should ever be necessary, since no such issue 
was tendered, tried, and- passed' on in this trial. See : 
_ Section 181-M ait'ers R.aise:fl, bwt Ign,ored or 
Withdra~rn in Preri.ous Action. 
''As far as subsequent p-roceedings under a 
differ·ent cause of ·acti·on are concerned, the doc-
trine of res judicata is held not to apply to an 
issue raised in the previous cause which was not 
passed on by the court or jury in deciding it. 
Thus an issue raised by the pleadings which is 
withdrawn befor.e trial does not operate as res 
judicata.'' * * * 30 Ameriean Juris prudence, Page 
927. 
Section 174-Test of Tden.tity of !Causes of 
Action. In the application of .the doctrin~ of res 
judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action 
is for the same cause of action as the first, the 
test generally applied is to consider the identity 
· of facts essential to th·eir mainten,ance, or whether 
the same facts would sustain both. * * * If, how-
·ever, the two actions arise upon different sets of 
facts, or different ·p·roofs would be ,required to 
.su~tain the two actions, a judgment in __ one is n9 
bar t~J judgillent 'in the other. It lias 1Jeen sa,id 
that this ·method is ike b~est '.aJnd mos't co~rrect test, 
as to whether a fo'rmer judgment is ~a ba,r in sub-
seqi.lent proceedings between the same ·parties, 
and it has even been designated ,as infallible." 
30 American J uris~prudence, 918. 
Section 180-Judgments-D·ifferent Causes 
of Act~on. The rule granting eonclusiveness to a 
judgment in regard to issues of fact which could 
properly have be-en determined in the action is 
limited to cases involving the same cause of 
action. \Vhere a second cause of action is upon 
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a different claim, demand, or cause of action the 
est:~blished rule is that the judgment in the first 
action operates 'as an estoppel only as to the 
points or questions .ACTUALL.Y LITIGATED· 
AND DE·TERMINED, and N·OT AS TO MAT'-
TERS NOT LITIGATED IN THE FORMER 
ACTION, EVEN THO·UGH SUCH MATTERS 
MIGHT PR:OPERLY HAVE BEEN DETER-
MINED THEREIN.''-30 American Jurispru-
dence 925. 
It has be-en held that in a quiet title action the 
Court only: 
' ' * * * determines in such action * * * that 
the pl}evailing party has a title superior to, or 
good as against that established by his adversary. 
All that we de-cide, or that we could decide, is 
that plaintiff has established a title or right * * * 
superior to, or good as against the title or claim 
the defendant asserted or could assert.' '-Ham-
mond vs. Jnhnson, 75 Pacific 2d 164, 94 Utah 35 
(1938). 
·So -that the ordinary quiet title action respecting this 
half interest in the ''Yell ow Cir;cle'' group, could not, 
and would not ·operate as a bar to any pro'per accounting 
between the· parties, now or in the future. This is further 
strengthened by the statement of the rule to be followed 
~as laid down in Glen Allen MiwitnJg Co. vs. p,ark Galena 
Mining Co., 296 Pacific 232, 77 Utah 362 : 
Page 234: ''No issue was offered between 
Anderson and Glen Allen Mining Company when 
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the Inotion was heard, and Anderson was not 
served with notice that such a question would be 
litigated. The trial court recognized these con-
ditions when it detern1ined the motion to vacate 
and set aside the s·ale, and refused to det·ermine 
the question of trust relationship·, and limited the 
judgn1ent to a denial of the motion to s·et aside 
the sale. Under these conditions, Anderson ought 
not to be oound by any judgment upon that ques-
tion, and it follows as a matter of course that 
the Glen Allen ~lining ·Company could not be 
bound (as a t·aker through Anderson).'' 
Appellant claims (Appellant's Brief, page 26) that 
an alleged transf·er of respondent's interest has been 
"recorded to his prejudice. Although this matter is dehors 
the reeord, respondent wishes to point out that such 
transfer is to a trustee or in connection with th.e organ-
ization of the Arcana Development Company, and can 
in no-,vise adversely affect appellant. 
It is submitted that the decree of the trial court as 
rendered, and the trial proceedings themselves, will 
not be such as to preclude the ap·pellant with respect 
to any matter of accounting with these or the other 
mining claims involved in the dealings between these 
two parties. It follows, of course, that with no bar to 
a future accounting, the instant decree does not op·erate 
as res judicata, and could not have the effe·cts claimed 
by appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
RESPO.·NDENT 'S POINT' III: IMMATERIAL 
FIND·ING NOT ERROR. 
Respeeting app,ellant's second assignment of error, 
relating to ·an objection that the Court's Findings of 
Fact should not have i~cluded a finding that t~e appel-
lant had agreed to transfer his interest in said mining 
claims to a co:rjporation to be thereafter organized, in 
the exact language as set out in page 8 of Appellant's 
Brief, it is deemed sufficient to refer the Court to S~ec­
tion 1787, :Title, AJppe~ & Error, P~age 1192, 5 Corpus 
Juris Secundum, where the following ap·pears: 
''R.ev;ersible error cannot be found in the 
mere fact that a court makes superfluous and un-
necessary findings. 
''A judgment sup·ported by proper findings 
is not vitiated by findings on immaterial points 
or issues, for example, on issues outside the plead-
ings, or unsup!ported by evidence, * * * '' 
CONCLlTSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the deci-
·sion, findings, judgment, and de~cree of the trial court 
is and was correct, proper, and in accordance with law 
in all respects, that appellant has not sustained the 
burden of showing any error, nor does any error appear 
warranting the reversal of, or modification of the judg-
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nlent, and, that the same should be affirmed, on app·eal, 
with costs to the respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONALD T. ADAMS, 
Monticello, Utah, 
R. :s .. JOHNSON, 
207 Atla.s Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah, 
Attorneys for Plaimtiff 
and Responden,t. 
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